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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) 1953 as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows. 
1. Whether the district court erred when it found that the parties had 
not reconciled after living together as husband and wife for four years 
and enforced the terms of the Order of Separate Maintenance, including 
the executory provisions. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the parties because they 
did not specifically rescind the agreement, intended that the agreement 
remain in effect despite the evidence that the terms of the agreement 
were never followed. 
3. Whether the trial court erred when it found that the Order of Separate 
maintenance was an arms length agreement. 
The standard of review for property distribution in divorce actions 
is the Abuse of Discretion standard. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P2d. 820 
(Utah App. 1990). The trial court's findings in a property distribution 
will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous and against the 
clear weight of the evidence or unless the court reaches a definite firm 
conviction that a mistake was made. Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 
(Utah App. 1990), Weston v Weston, 773 P.2d 408 (Utah App. 1990). 
This standard is applicable to all three issues. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
The issues presented involve primarily case law. The only 
determinative statute is Utah Code Annotated § 30-4-3(3). 
The court may change the support or maintenance of a 
party from time to time according to circumstances, and may 
terminate altogether any obligation upon satisfactory proof of 
voluntary and permanent reconciliation. An order or decree of 
support or maintenance shall in every case be valid only during the 
joint lives of the husband and wife. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. The parties were married for 25 years. The parties were married 
March 16, 1974 in Wellington Ohio and were divorced in March of 1999. 
Beverly never took Gary's last name and has always been known by the 
last name of Burge not Facio. R. 13,17,246,247. 
2. Beverly filed for divorce in 1981, and again filed for divorce in 1989 
and again in 1992. The divorce filing in 1992 was eventually converted 
to a separate maintenance agreement and further amended to a divorce 
complaint on October 7,1997. The parties were divorced on March 18, 
1999. R. 27. Tr 17-18, Tr. 30,146. 
3. The parties separated in 1991 and in 1992, Beverly's attorney, Louise 
Knauer, drafted a complaint for separate maintenance. Gary was 
unrepresented by counsel and signed a consent and waiver of service. 
The Order for Separate maintenance incorporated all of the terms of the 
complaint and was signed August 27, 1992. R.1-7,R 9-10, R. 19-24 Tr. 
31. 
4. The parties owned two pieces of real property;there was a house on E 
Street in the Avenues and a house on Live Oak Circle in Holladay. Tr. 
32. The E Street home was sold and the proceeds split between the 
parties. The Live Oak home was purchased in 1989 and titled in 
Beverly's name only. Beverly was awarded the Live Oak home and all of 
her retirement accounts. R. 19-20, Tr. at 32, 116. 
5. Gary moved back in to the marital home in late 1993. Tr. 49-50, 
115,154, R. 244. 
6. After Gary moved back in the home, the child support and other 
financial terms of the separate maintenance agreement were not followed 
or enforced. Tr 53, 118-120. 
7. The children's medical expenses were never paid evenly between the 
parties. Tr. 120. 
8. Gary never obtained the life insurance specified in the separation 
agreement or paid the debts he was ordered to pay. Tr. 43, 45. 
9. When Gary moved back in the home, Beverly resumed wearing her 
wedding ring after Gary put the ring back on Beverly's hand. Tr. 174. 
10. The parties lived as husband and wife after Gary moved back in the 
home. Tr. 162. 
11. Beverly never attempted to collect the child support from Gary after 
he moved back in the home because in her heart she was hoping that 
everything would work out. Tr. 118-119. 
12. The parties maintained one joint stock account after Gary moved 
back in. Tr. 47. 
13. After the separation agreement was signed in 1992, the parties again 
lived together in the marital home from November 1993 until late 
September of 1997. R. 244. 
14. Beverly and the children used Gary's airline flight benefits after Gary 
moved back into the house. Beverly traveled as Gary's wife and was 
listed as his wife on the airline computer system. Tr. 137,171-172. 
15. Beverly has a pension plan and a thrift savings plan though her 
employment and an IRA. Tr. 61-62. 
16. Gary moved back out of the home in September of 1997. Tr. 54. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
After the parties signed the separation agreement in 1992, it is 
undisputed that the parties again lived together in the marital home from 
1993 until 1997, a period of nearly four years. Gary's argument is that 
the couple reconciled during the period of 1993 thru 1997 and as a 
result of the reconciliation the separation agreement was voided. The 
trial court found that the terms of the separate maintenance agreement 
regarding property division were valid and would be enforced; that no 
reconciliation had occurred to void the agreement between the parties 
during the 4 years that the parties again lived as man and wife, and that 
the agreement was an arms length transaction between represented 
parties. Gary was awarded no equity in the real property, no alimony, no 
furniture, and no interest in Beverly's retirement accounts. The trial 
Court erred when it found that the reconciliation was only "provisional" 
or "attempted". 
The trial court disregarded the evidence presented that virtually none 
of the provisions of the separate maintenance agreement were enforced 
after Gary moved back in, that the parties lived as husband and wife 
again for a 4 year period, that during the 5 year period between the time 
of entry of the separate maintenance agreement was entered in 1992 and 
the final separation in 1997 the parties lived separately for only one out 
of those five years. 
The trial court found the agreement to be an arms length transaction 
and that Gary had consulted with attorney Brian Barnard despite 
testimony to the contrary, letters written from Beverly's counsel directly 
to Gary and an affidavit from Mr. Barnard denying that he consulted 
with Gary on the matter. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it found that the parties had 
not reconciled after living together in the marital home 
with their children for nearly four years. 
"It appears to be well settled that reconciliation of husband and 
wife and resumption of marital relations for any period of time will render 
a previous contract and settlement of property rights void" Cox v Cox, 
659 So2d 1051,1053 (Fla. 1995), quoting Weeks v. Weeks 197 So. 393 
(Fla. 1940) (emphasis added). In Cox, the husband, James Cox, married 
his wife, Kimi Cox, in 1978 and eventually divorced 10 years later while 
serving in the military in Guam. Id. at 1052. The settlement agreement 
provided for child support and distributed the parties' property. Id. The 
agreement was silent as to the effects remarriage or reconciliation would 
have upon the agreement. Id. The parties remarried in 1989 and James 
Cox filed for divorce in 1990. Id. 
The trial court found that Kimi Cox was bound by the Guam 
settlement agreement and was therefore not entitled to an interest in 
James Cox's future military retirement benefits Id. On appeal, the 
District Court of Appeal certified the following question to the Florida 
Supreme Court: "[d]oes reconciliation or remarriage void a property 
settlement agreement or separation agreement as a matter of law? Id. 
The court held that "reconciliation or remarriage abrogates the executory 
provisions of a prior marital settlement agreement unless there is an 
explicit statement in the agreement that the parties intended otherwise." 
Id. at 1054. The court indicated that this holding is the majority view 
being followed by of 6 the 7 'sister' states of Florida. Id. 
The Cox court cited a public policy argument in favor of abrogation 
found in Brazina v. Brazina, 558 A2d. 69 (N.J. Super. Ch. 1989). 
The philosophy underpinning the theory of abrogation 
is that, since the policy of courts is to encourage and strengthen 
the bond of marriage, it is the presumed intent of the parties at the 
time of the reconciliation to resume the marital relationship in all 
respects and abrogate any prior agreements restricting or 
inhibiting the rights of one of the spouses unless they indicate 
otherwise at the time of the reconciliation. 
...However, it is recognized that the parties as well as third 
parties, should have the right to rely upon the validly of executed 
portions of the property settlement agreement. To hold other wise 
could create havoc not only for the parties themselves but for third 
parties as well who would be reluctant to contract with a separated 
but undivorced person for fear that reconciliation may have 
occurred which could have created in the other spouse legal 
interest in an asset even though that spouse relinquished all rights 
in that asset in an earlier property agreement. 
The Brazina case is on point with many of the facts before this 
court. The Mark and Donna Brazina were married in May of 1981 and 
separated in March 1985. Id. A property settlement agreement was 
signed in July 1985 whereby the wife conveyed her interest in the home 
to the husband who had purchased the home in 1982 with his father's 
assistance. Id. at 70-71. The wife moved back into the home in April of 
1986. Id. at 71 . No agreement was made to set aside the conveyance of 
the home. Id. No discussion was had as to what effect the reconciliation 
would have upon the separation agreement. Id. The husband continued 
to pay weekly child support of $40 to the wife and paid all of the home 
expenses whereas the wife paid for food, household incidentals and 
clothing for her and their child. Id. The parties separated in August of 
1988, less than two and a half years after moving back into the home, 
and a divorce followed. Id. The wife claimed that the property settlement 
was abrogated by the reconciliation whereas the husband claimed there 
never was a reconciliation but rather a platonic relationship where they 
lived together as friends for their mutual benefit. Id. The husband 
contended that even if there was a reconciliation, it should not have an 
effect on the property settlement agreement unless the parties had 
expressly agreed to alter or rescind it. Id. 
The Brazina court was concerned that legal consequences not be 
imposed upon spouses who are separated and are attempting to resolve 
their differences through "trial reconciliations". The Brazina court 
proceeded to answer the question of what constitutes a reconciliation 
and offered a summary of the case law on the subject. Two acts of 
sexual intercourse was found to only be an attempt to reconcile and did 
not constitute a reconciliation. Cooke v. Cooke, 237 S.E. 2d 323 (N.C. 
App. 1977). Ten days in the marital home was not enough for a 
reconciliation. Camp v. Camp, 331 S.E.2d 163 (N.C. App. 1985). 
However, in North Carolina, when the parties have lived together in the 
marital home for eight months they are deemed reconciled as a matter of 
law whether or not they engaged in conjugal relations. Matter of Estate 
of Adamee, 230 S.E. 2d 541 (N.C. 1976). Other courts have found 
reconciliation after only three months. See Miller v. Miller, 616 P2d 313 
(Mont. 1980). Appellant has found only one case that has held that a 
time period exceeding more than a few months long was not a 
reconciliation. See Wood v Wood, 309 A.2d 103 (D.C. 1973) Wood was 
decided prior to any of the other cases cited and has not been followed. 
In Bourne v. Bourne, 521 S.E.2d (Ct. App. 1990) despite a reconciliation, 
the court upheld some provisions in a separation agreement because the 
settlement agreement specifically provided that the agreement would 
remain if full force if the parties reunited. Id. Nevertheless, the court 
refused to uphold a provision of the contract where the parties mutually 
agreed not to support each other in the future even after a reconciliation 
because it was void as a matter of public policy. Id. at 646. 
The Brazina court was satisfied that since the parties had resided 
together for two years in the marital home with their child, they had 
passed the "trial period" or the "attempt to reconcile stage" and had in 
fact reconciled. Id. at 72. The court held that the executed portions of 
the agreement were valid which meant that the wife had no legal interest 
in the marital home. Id. at 73 [emphasis added]. The court followed In 
Re the Marriage of Reeser, 635 P.2d 930 (Colo App. 1981), and held that 
the wife had an equitable interest in the marital home from the time of 
reconciliation until divorce and was entitled to a share of the equity 
accumulated during that period. Id. at 74 [emphasis added]. This 
appears to be the majority view. 
A minority view, that equity accruing on real estate remains 
separate property after a reconciliation was the holding in Kaminsky v. 
Kaminsky, 364 S.E. 2d 799 (W.Va. 1987). The facts in this case are 
different than the case before this court in two respects. First, the 
property was actually conveyed, and secondly, one of the parties had sold 
the property and invested the proceeds into other investments. Id. at 
801. The Live Oak home was always titled in Beverly's name only. This 
case has not been followed in any other jurisdiction. 
In Reeser, the parties had executed a separation agreement that 
whereby the husband conveyed his joint interest in the real property to 
the wife. Id at 930. The parties reconciled only a month later and lived 
together until divorcing five years later. Id. On appeal, the court found 
that the husband was entitled to an interest in the amount of 
appreciation that accrued on the home during the period of reconciliation 
after the wife became the sole owner of the home. Id. at 933. In Reeser, 
as in the case at bar, there was also testimony that the husband had an 
inability to manage his funds. Id. The court also found that although 
the property settlement regarding the furniture was executed prior to 
reconciliation, the provision had been abrogated. Id. at 932. 
This court should hold that, as a matter of law, where the parties 
resided in the marital home and lived as husband and wife for more than 
three years, they have reconciled and prior separation agreements are 
abrogated as to the executory portions. 
The trial court erred when it ruled that there was 
no mutual intent to reconcile or to abrogate the agreement. 
Appellants position is that after 4 years of resumption of marital 
relations intent is not required. Nevertheless, there was mutual intent to 
reconcile and to abrogate the terms of the separation agreement. 
The actions of Gary and Beverly did not indicate an intent to 
enforce the agreement but rather an intent to abandon the agreement. 
Beverly stated that she did not think of Gary as simply a roommate. Tr. 
54. Gary testified that they lived as husband and wife. Tr. 162. The on 
going terms of the agreement itself were never enforced. Gary never paid 
regular child support or the children's medical expenses after moving 
back in the home and Beverly never attempted to collect it. Gary helped 
around the house, he took the kids to school. The parties and the 
children took trips using Gary's airline benefits. 
Reconciliation is the voluntary resumption of marital relations in 
the fullest sense. It means something more than mere resumption of 
cohabitation and observance of civility and comprehends a fresh start 
and genuine effort by both parties to avoid the pitfalls originally causing 
separation. Black's Law Dictionary 881 (Abridged 6 th ed. 1991). At least 
one state has defined the term "Resumption of marital relations" as the 
"voluntary renewal of the husband and wife relationship, as shown by 
the totality of the circumstances. Isolated incidents of sexual intercourse 
between the parties shall not constitute resumption of marital relations. " 
N.C. Gen Stat. Sec 52-10.2 (1991). 
In Schultz v. Schultz, 420 S.E. 2d 186 ( N.C. App. 1992), the 
parties, Elizabeth and Gerald Schultz entered into a consent agreement 
regarding the marital home and alimony in March of 1984. Id. Gerald 
agreed to convey the house, make the mortgage payments on the house 
and pay $400 in alimony. Id. Gerald conveyed the house but only made 
one alimony payment. Id. The parties separated for over 6 years until 
Gerald moved back into the marital home in June of 1990. Id. Only 
four months later, Elizabeth asked Gerald to leave the home. Gerald 
refused to leave and filed to void the consent judgment because the 
parties had reconciled. Id. The trial court determined that the parties 
had not reconciled based upon the following finding of fact: 
16. Although there was an intent on behalf of the 
defendant to reconcile, the plaintiff intended to reconcile only 
on the condition that the defendant would change his 
actions and personality traits which had originally caused 
the discord between the parties. The evidence shows that 
the defendant did not change his behavior, and that there 
were problems from the day that the defendant returned 
until the present. There was no mutual intent to establish a 
permanent reconciliation. Rather, there was a conditional 
intent on behalf of the plaintiff and that condition has not 
been fulfilled. Consequently, no reconciliation occurred. 
Id. at 187. 
In the case at bar, the following similar finding of fact was made by 
the trial court judge. 
There was a —it would appear to the court from the facts 
that were presented, there was a tentative, conditional attempted 
reconciliation based on the respondent's performance of certain 
conditions. Those conditions were outlined in part on the letter of 
32 exhibit B, and other matters as testified to by the Court. 
The respondent testified in some candor that as he described 
it, "it's still a work in progress." In other words he never did 
perform any of the conditions that he promised as a condition for 
the reconciliation. The condition was never met. It is clear that the 
parties never petitioned the Court to return the agreement. It is 
clear that the parties following the—what the Court would call a 
provisional and attempted reconciliation. 
Tr. at 191. 
The rule established in Adamee and followed in Schultz is that if 
the facts are not disputed that the parties resumed marital relations, 
then it is error to examine mutual intent. Id. at 190. The Schultz court 
found that because it was undisputed that Gerald Schultz kept his 
automobile at the residence, lived in the residence continuously; moved 
his belongings into the house; paid the utility bills and other joint bills; 
mowed the lawn, and kept his animals at the house. Id. It was also 
undisputed that Elizabeth did his laundry, went shopping, worked in the 
yard and had sexual relations. Id. These facts alone, absent any intent, 
over only a four month period, were sufficient for the court to find that a 
reconciliation voided the executory portions of the agreement, specifically 
the obligation to pay alimony in the future. Many of those same facts 
exist between Gary and Beverly-over a four year period. 
The trial court appeared to hold that because the reconciliation 
between Gary and Beverly eventually failed and ended in a divorce- that 
there never was a reconciliation- it was only a "provisional", "attempted" 
reconciliation. This holding is contrary to every reported case on the 
subject and has no basis in law. A reconciliation does not need to be 
successful to be valid. All of the cases cited in this brief involved 
reconciliations that eventually failed. 
The difficulty in determining the intent of parties as to 
reconciliation was explained in the Yeich v Yeich, 399 S.E. 2d 170 (Va. 
App. 1990). The trial court found that although the parties had lived 
together for four years after signing a settlement agreement, since there 
were no words, actions, or agreements by the parties after reconciliation 
that demonstrated an intent to abrogate any provision of the agreement 
that it remained in force. Id. at 172. The criticism of this "factual proof 
of intent" approach is that if the parties clearly expressed their intent 
concerning the effect of reconciliation on the agreement, they would re-
open old wounds that had only begun to heal. Id. 
The Yeich court held that 
[t]he majority view that we adopt is premised on the 
assumption that at the time the parties executed the 
separation agreement they intended to live separate and 
apart; when they reestablished a matrimonial home they 
thereby necessarily intended to void those portions of the 
agreement that remain executory (emphasis added). 
Id. at 173. 
There was testimony from Beverly that after Gary moved back in 
1993, the parties did not resume a joint account and that they tried to 
keep their finances separate. This is not surprising since, in accordance 
with the definition, reconciliation is a "fresh start" and an attempt by the 
parties to avoid the "pitfalls originally causing the separation" Black's, 
supra. 
Beverly testified that she maintained a separate checking account 
after the separation agreement was entered. It is understandable that 
when parties reconcile, they will make some changes in their marriage in 
order to correct some of the pitfalls and hopefully not repeat the mistakes 
that caused the separation in the first place. It is not surprising, indeed 
it would be more surprising, if Beverly did not take more control over the 
financial matters in the household since Gary's financial status was a 
major issue leading to the past separations. 
There is no requirement that the parties 
affirmatively cancel the agreement. 
The trial court also indicated that because the parties did not 
return to court to cancel the separation agreement the agreement would 
remain valid notwithstanding the parties' actions. The opposite view, 
that the separation agreement is abrogated unless the parties specifically 
indicate otherwise is the holding in all of these cases. Some courts have 
gone further and held that even if the parties agree after a reconciliation 
that neither party is obligated to support the other party in the future, 
the agreement will be void as against public policy. Bourne, 521 S.E.2d 
519,521. 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-4-3(3) states 
The court may change the support or maintenance of a party 
from time to time according to circumstances, and may terminate 
altogether any obligation upon satisfactory proof of voluntary and 
permanent reconciliation. An order or decree of support or 
maintenance shall in every case be valid only during the joint lives 
of the husband and wife. 
Utah's statute, while allowing the parties to alter or terminate the 
agreement, does not require that the parties affirmatively do so and 
specifically grants the court the authority to terminate the agreement 
upon proof of reconciliation. 
The trial court erred when it failed to equitably divide 
the executory portions of the separation agreement 
between the parties. 
The Appellants position, consistent with the cases presented is that 
the previously executed portions of the agreement are enforceable and 
should not be disturbed. The portions of the agreement that remain 
executory however should be abrogated by the reconciliation. The 
portions of the agreement that remain executory are Beverly's retirement 
and savings plans from the Post Office, her IRAs, the equity in the Live 
Oak home that accumulated between 1993 and 1999, alimony, and the 
furniture and other personal property. The equity accruing in the home 
is executory and subject to division. Schultz, Reeser, Brazina, supra. 
Future retirement benefits are by definition executory. Cox v. Cox, 659 
So. 2d 1051, 1054-55. Separation agreements regarding furniture are 
abrogated upon a reconciliation. Reeser, 635 P.2d. 930, 932. 
REAL PROPERTY 
Based upon the reconciliation, Gary should be entitled to share of 
the equity that accrued at the Live Oak home between the period of 
reconciliation and the divorce. Two appraisals exist in the record. 
Exhibits 34 and 35. The first values the home at $135,000 on September 
4, 1992, one month after the separation agreement was signed. The 
second was conducted in February of 1999 at the time of the divorce and 
at appraised the home at $216,000. Gary should be entitled to an 
equitable share of the $81,000 in equity. 
BEVERLY'S RETIREMENT 
Beverly is still employed with the Postal Service. Since all of the 
retirement benefits are executory, the separation agreement, if abrogated 
through reconciliation, should have no effect upon this marital asset. 
Accordingly, Gary should be entitled to an equitable share of all of 
Beverly's retirement benefits and IRA's, for the entire 25 years of the 
marriage. 
ALIMONY 
The separation agreement waived alimony for either party. If the 
separation agreement is abrogated by reconciliation, Gary should be 
entitled to alimony for the entire length of the marriage minus the 
separation period when the separation agreement may have been valid. 
FURNITURE 
The personal property division made in the separation agreement 
would also be an executory provision. Once Gary moved back in the 
marital home and reconciled, the personal property and furniture again 
became marital property. 
The trial court erred when it found that Gary was 
represented by counsel during the separation agreement. 
The trial court found that Gary had consulted with Brian Barnard 
regarding the separate maintenance action R. 355. This finding is not 
supported by the evidence or the record. R. 11, Exhibit 42. Mr. Barnard 
never appeared in the case and provided a statement that he never 
consulted with Gary on the matter. Louise Knauer sent correspondence 
directly to Gary rather than to Mr. Barnard notwithstanding Beverly's 
testimony that she discussed with Ms. Knauer that Gary was represented 
by Mr. Barnard. Exhibit 39 Tr. 114. 
Because Gary was not represented by counsel, it was error to 
conclude that the agreement, drafted by Beverly's attorney was 
necessarily an arms length transaction. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the prevailing case law regarding reconciliation, and 
the evidence presented at trial, it is clear that the trial court erred when 
it failed to find that the parties had reconciled. The trial court erred by 
failing to abrogate the executory portions of the Order for Separate 
Maintenance. Gary should have been awarded a share of the equity in 
the home, an interest in Beverly's retirement plans and accounts, 
alimony, and additional furniture and personal property. As a result of 
the trial courts error, Gary Facio has taken nothing from a marriage that 
lasted 25 years. 
ATED this \ T day of August, 2001. 
David P. Carson 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT to be hand delivered this 14th day of August, 2001 to the 
following: 
Original and 7 copies to: 
Clerk, Utah Court of Appeals 
450 S. State St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
2 copies to: 
Connie Mower 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City Utah 84111 
UrfRpr^ 
David Larson 
Attorney for Appellant 
ADDENDUM CONTENTS 
Appraisal of Live Oak home Feb. 12, 1999. 
Appraisal of Live Oak Home Sept. 4, 1992. 
Letter from Louise Knauer to Gary Facio 9-18-91. 
Memorandum from Brian Barnard. 
Certificate of Service. 
APPRAISAL OF REAL PROPERTY 
LOCATED AT: 
2869 E Live Oak Circle 
Lot 9 Spring Creek Subdivision 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
3*/ 
FOR: 
Beverly A. Burge 
E. Live Oak Drive, Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
AS OF: 
February 12, 1999 
BY: 
Raymond K. Knudson 
v^((^c| 
YPwrfptfw uwirmtm ticoiucwiiMi. arrnaioiu. net urn File No. 7 4 k 0 2 9 
Property Address 2 8 6 9 E Live O a k Circle City Salt Lake City State Utah Zip Code 8 4 1 1 7 
Legal Description Lot 9 Spring Creek Subdivision County Salt Lake 
I Assessor's Parcel No 2 2 0 2 3 5 2 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 Tax Year 1997 RE Taxes $ 1.695 74 Special Assessments $ 0 00 
I Borrower N/A Current Owner Beverly A Burge Occupant E*3 Owner I } Tenant I l Vacant 
Property rights appraised IX] fee Simple I I Leasehold Project Type I I PUD I I Condominium (HUD/VA only) HOASN/A /Mo 
Neighborhood or Protect Name Map Reference 7160'90Cen Census Tract 1109 
Sale Prlce$ N/A Date of Sale N/A Description and $ amount of loan charges/concessions lo be paid by seller N/A 
Lender/Client Beverly A Burge Address 2869 E Live Oak Drive. Salt Lake City. UT 84117 
Appraiser Raymond K. Knudson 
EX] Suburban L J Rural 
• 25 75% ( J Under 25% 
( 3 Stable • Slow 
E 3 Stable • Declining 
E 3 in balance • Over supply 
E 3 3-6 mos n Over 6 mos 
Address 774 East 2100 South Salt Lake City. Utah 84106 
Single family housin Location |_| Urban 
Built up g ] Over 75% 
Growth rate Q Rapid 
Property values • Increasing 
Demand/supply • Shortage 
Marketing time f~1 Under 3 mos 
Predominant 
occupancy 
£ 3 Owner 95 
• Tenant 5 
( 3 Vacant (0 5%) 
i~1 Vac (over 5%) 
J
PRICE 
$(000) 
125 
500 
Low 
,Jng 
AGE 
(yrs) 
10 
80 
•Predominant I 
Present land use % 
One family 95 
2-4 family 2 
Multi-family _ _ 2 _ _ 
Commercial 1 
175 30 
Land use change 
[ 3 Not likely D Likely 
D In process 
To 
Note: Race and the racial composition of tha neighborhood aro not appraisal factors 
Neighborhood boundaries and characteristics 4500 South on the North. 1-215 on the East. 6200 South on the South and Holladay Blvd on the West 
Factors that affect the marketability of the properties In the neighborhood (proximity to employment and amenities, employment stability, appeal to market etc) 
The subject property is located in a mature residential neighborhood In the Holladay Area of the Salt Lake Valley The homes and yards are 
well maintained The area is centrally located in the valley with churches, schools, shopping and other amenities within one mile The maior 
employment centers are from 10-20 miles away with freeway access 1 mile to the East 
Market conditions in the subject neighborhood (including support for the above conclusions related to the trend of property values, demand/supply, and marketing time 
•- such as data on competitive properties for sale In the neighborhood, description of the prevalence of sales and financing concessions, etc) 
The current real estate market in the Utah area is healthy with low interest rates, high emptoyment and is basically in balance with sellers and 
buyers operating on a level playing field with neither the buyer or the seller being able to take advantage of each other in negotiating a sales 
price Normal marketing time in this neighborhood is generally between 60-120 days 
I Project Information for PUDs (If applicable) • - Is the developer/builder In control of the Home Owners Association (HOA)? [ ) Yes (X] No 
Approximate total number of units In the subject project N/A Approximate total number of units for sale in the subject prelect N/A 
I Describe common elements and recreational facilities N/A 
Dimensions 105x95 
Site area 23 acre lot Corner Lot Q Yes K | No 
Specific zoning classification and descnption R-1-10 (Single Family Residential 10,000 msf) 
Zoning compliance £ 3 Legal • Legal nonconforming (Grandfathered use) Q illegal • No zoning 
Highest & best use as Improved E 3 Present use [~1 Other use (explain) 
Utilities 
I Etectncfty 
Gas 
Water 
Public Other 
B. 
El. 
Sanitary sewer £ < ] . 
I Storm sewer [X] 
Off-site Improvements 
Street Asphalt 
Type 
Curb/gutter Concrete 
Public Private 
_K • 
_B D Sidewalk None 
Street lights None 
Alley None 
.D D 
n n 
Topography 
Size 
Shape 
Drainage 
View 
Slope to S W 
Typical/Adequate 
Rectangular 
Adeg To Lot Line 
Neighborhood/Average 
Typical 
Driveway Surface Asphalt 
Apparent easements Typical Utility 
FEMA Special Rood Hazard Area • Yes [X] No 
FEMA Zone Z o n e C Map Date 12/18/85 
FEMA Map No 490102 0316 B 
P U E over Comments (apparent adverse easements, encroachments, special assessments slide areas Illegal or legal no conforming zoning use, etc) 
perimeter lot lines The appraiser assumes that there are no hidden or unapparent conditions of the property, subsoil, or structures 
GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
p a Effective Age {Yrs) 15 
No of Units 
No of Stories 
Type (Del/Aft) 
Design (Style) 
Existing/Proposed 
Age (Yrs) 
1 
1 
Detached 
Cotemp 
Exist 
4 0 years 
EXTERIOR DESCRIPTION 
Foundation Concrete 
Exterior Walls 
Roof Surface 
Brick/Wood 
Tar&Gravel 
Gutters & Dwnspts Yes/Alum 
Window Type Single Pane 
Storm/Screens Yes 
Manufactured House No 
FOUNDATION 
Slab No 
Crawl Space No 
Basement Pull 
Sump Pump No 
Dampness No 
Settlement No 
Infestation No 
1.790 
BASEMENT 
AreaSq Ft 
% Finished 8 5 % 
Ceiling 
Walls Wood 
Floor 
Ace THe 
Asph Tile 
Outside Entry Walkout 
INSULATION 
Roof 
Ceiling Avq [X] 
Walls A v g P 3 
• 
• 
Unknown Q 
Floor 
None 
ROOMS Foyer LlYino Dining Kitchen Den Family Rm Rec Rm Bedrooms! Laundry Other AreaSq Ft 
Basement 1 1,790 
Level 1 Area Area Area 1,8361 
Level 2 
H Finished area above grade contains. 6 Rooms, 3 Bedroom(s) 2 Bath(s) 1,836 Square Feet of Gross Living Area 
H I INTERIOR 
j Floors 
Walls 
Trim/Finish 
Bath Floor 
Materials/Condition 
HdwCrptVin/Average 
PanelDrywal l /Avg 
Streamline/Avg 
Vinyl /Average 
Bath Wainscot Ceramic /Avg 
I Doors Hol-cor/Average 
HEATING 
Type F W A 
Fuel G a s 
Condition Avg 
COOLING 
Central 
Other - 0 -
Yes 
Condition Good 
KITCHEN EQUIP 
Refrigerator • 
Range/Oven [X] 
Disposal E J 
Dishwasher [ 3 
Fdn/Hood 
Microwave • 
u Washer/Dryer |~| 
ATTIC 
None 
Stairs 
Drop Stair 
Scuttle 
Floor 
Heated 
Finished 
• 
• 
• 
n 
u 
AMENITIES 
Flreplace(s) # 2 
Patio 
Deck 
Porch 
Fence 
.H 
.8 
M 
.• Pool Hot Tub 
AutoSpnkSys 
_ & 
CAR STORAGE 
None • 
Garage 
Attached 
Detached 
Built-in 
Carport 
Driveway 
# of cars 
Asphalt 
Additional features (special energy efficient items, etc) Fully landscaped, rock retaining walls, large deck, and patio T h e interior has lots of wood 
I paneling, tile entryway and stone walls in entry and around fireplace and a furnace for each floor 
j Condition of the Improvements, depreciation (physical, functional, and external) repairs needed quality of construction, remodeling/additions, etc No external \ 
obsolescence has been observed Functional obsolescence of 4 % for flat roof Physical depreciation attributable to normal wear and tear is 
estimated to be 1 5 % and is based on 1 % per year for the effective age of the home 
Adverse environmental conditions (such as, but not limited to, hazardous wastes, toxic substances, etc) present in the Improvements on the site, or in the 
[ immediate vicinity of the subject property No adverse conditions found or noted on or near the subiect property 
Freddie Mac Form 70 6/93 PAGE 1 OF 2 Fannie Mae Form 1004 6/93 
UNIFtirtM RESIDENTIAL APPRAISAL Rfci-ORT nitNo. 74K029 
I ESTIMATED SITE VALUE 
I ESTIMATED REPRODUCTION COST-NEW-OF IMPROVEMENTS; 
= $_ 70,000 
| Dwelling, 1,836 Sq. Ft, @$ 72.00 
1,520 Sq. Ft. @$ 12.45 = 
I I Patio/Deck/CentralAC/Fireplaces 
| Garage/Carport 484 Sq. Ft. @$ 12.25 
Total Estimated Cost New 
Less Physical 
Depreciation 24,9751 
$ 
$ 
132,200 
18,900 
9,500 
5,900 
166,500 
Functional External 
Depreciated Value of Improvements 
"As-ls" Value of Site Improvements 
INDICATED VALUE BY COST APPROACH 
25,000 
141 3C0 
5,500 
217,000 
Data and/or 
Verification Source 
Inspection and 
County Records 
Wasatch Front MLS 
#58140 
Comments on Cost Approach (such as, source of cost estimate, site value, 
square foot calculation and for HUD, VA and FmHA, the estimated remaining 
economic life of the property): The cost approach has been derived 
from local building costs as per contractors as well as 
Marshali/Swift cost estimates. 
89 52 <ft| 
Wasatch Front MLS 
#18068 
Wasatch Front MLS 
#53001 
VALUE ADJUSTMENTS DESCRIPTION DESCRIPTION 
Sales or Financing 
Concessions 
Date of Sale/Time 
Location 
N e w Conv.* 
I Normal Cone. 
Good 
1/28/99 
Good 
+ ( - ) $ Adjust. DESCRIPTION 
N e w Conv 
Normal Cone. 
8/5/98 
Good 
+ H S Adjust. DESCRIPTION + ( - ) $ Adjust. 
New Conv. 
Normai Cone. 
2/10/99 
Good 
Leasehold/Fee Simple F e e Simple F e e Simple F e e Simple F e e Simple 
Site .23 acre lot .32 acre lot 29 acre lot 25 acre lot 
View Neborhod/Avg Neborhod/Avg Neborhod/Avg Vatley/Good -5,000 
Design and Appeal Contmp/Avg. Rambler/Good Contmp/Avg. Rambler/Avg. 
Quality of Construction BrickWood/Avg BnckWood/Avg. BrlcKVinyl/Avg. •1 ,500 BrickStn/Avg. -2,500 
Age 4 0 years 39 years 43 years 33 years 
Condition Average Needs Work/Fair +20,000 Average Good -7,500 
Above Grade 
Room Count 
Gross Living Area 
Total :Bdrms: Baths Total iBdrmsi Baths 
6 
Total i Bdrms: Baths Total :Bdrms: Baths 
1 
1.836 Sq. Ft 1,824 Sq.FL 2,480 Sq. ft -16,100 1,688 Sq. Ft. 
+3,000 
+3,700 
I Basement & Finished 
I Rooms Below Grade 
1,790SF85%Fin 
2BdrBaRecDen 
1824SF90%Fin 
BdrBaRec -1,000 
748SF100%Fin 
BdrBaRec 
+10,000 
+7,500 
1688SF100%Fin 
2Bdr1.5BaRec 
+1,000 
+1500 
| Functional Utility Flat Roof Flat Roof Average -6,000 Flat Roof 
[Heating/Cooling FWA/Central FWA/Central FWA/Swamp +1,500 FWA/Swamp +1,500 
• Energy Efficient Items No Thermo No Thermo Thermo Pane -1,500 No Thermo 
I Garage/Carport 2-Carport 2-Carport 2-Carport 2 Deep Garage -4,000 
Porch, Patio, Deck, 
Flreplace(s), etc. 
Deck/Patio 
2 Fireplaces 
Deck/Patio 
2-Fireplace 
NoDeck/Patio 
1-Fireplace 
+1,500 
+2,500 
No Deck/Patio 
2-Fireplace 
•1,500 
Fence, Pool, etc. Full Ldsp Full Ldsp Full Ldsp Full Ldsp 
Hot Tub No Hot Tub +1,500 No Hot Tub +1,500 No Hot Tub +1,500 
Comments on Sales Comparison (including the subject property's compatibility to the neighborhood, etc)' The land value is typical for the subject's market 
area and has been derived by abstraction. All sales conform to the typical F N M A guidelines The adjusted sale prices range from a low of 
$213,000 to a high of $221,400 AH sales equally support a mid range value for an estimated market value of $216,000. 
ITEM SUBJECT COMPARABLE NO. 1 COMPARABLE NO. 2 COMPARABLE NO. 3 
Date, Price and Data 
Source, for prior sales 
within year of appraisal 
None 
Owner 
None 
Wasatch Front MLS 
None 
Wasatch Front MLS 
None 
Wasatch Front MLS 
Analysis of any current agreement of sale, option, or listing of subject property and analysis of any prior sales of subject and comparables within one year of the date of 
The subject has not been listed or sold during the last 12 months. 
INDICATED VALUE BY SALES COMPARISON APPROACH 
INDICATED VALUE BY INCOME APPROACH (if Applicable) 
iX]"asls" 
Estimated Market Rent $ N/ft /Mo. x Gross Rent Multiplier 
L J subject to the repairs, alterations, inspections or conditions listed below jm. 
172,000 
JM This appraisal is made 
Conditions of Appraisal: 
L J subject to completion per plans & specifications 
Final Reconciliation1 The cost approach is $217,000. The market approach $216,000. The income approach has been considered however no 
rental data available to determine value via the income approach. Weight is given to the market approach. 
The purpose of this appraisal is to estimate the market value of the real property that is the subject of this report, based on the above conditions and the certification, contingent 
and limiting conditions, and market-value definition that are stated In the attached Freddie Mac Form 439/FNMA form 1004B (Revised 6/93 ). 
I (WE) ESTIMATE THE mW^^^m^mi, OF THE REAL PROPERTY THAT IS THE SUBJ^CWI^SJEPORI^S OF February 12, 1999 
(WHlCHISTHEDATEOFINSPEB^^HEEffiCTlVEDATEOFTHlSREPORTjTOBE , 
I APPRAISER:
 /y /(^/( / , SUr*E$1S0RY APPRAISER^ 
I Signature 
iNama Raymond 
1 Date Report Signed February 12, 1999 
• State Certification # State 
I Or State License # R A 0 0 0 5 3 7 4 2 State U T Or State License # 
Freddie Mac Form 70 6/93 PAGF 9 Of 0 
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APPRAISAL OF REAL PROPERTY 
LOCATED AT: 
2869 EAST LIVE OAK CIRCLE 
LOT 9 SPRING CREEK SUB 6128-2395 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
FOR: 
CRDSSIAND MORTGAGE 
4516 SOUTH 700 EAST; MURRAY, UTAH 84107 
REFINANCE: BEVERLY BURGE 
AS OF: 
4 SEPTEMBER 1992 
BY: 
FRED W. HOYER & GERALD B. HIGGS, ASA 
135k 
~D 
\ 
APPRAISAL PROFESSIONALS 
• H H H ^ i ^ l ^ i E 
"TOTAL" apprnlMt *>Kw»f« by • la mod* loe 1 (800) 32A-GA25 
4 SEPTEMBER 1992 
APPRAISAL PROFESSIONALS 
8701 GLIDER LANE 
SANDY, UTAH 84093 
Ms. Char Golay 
Crossland Mortgage 
4516 South 700 East 
NMrray, Utah 84107 
Dear Char, 
Pursuant to your request, we have prepared an appraisal report of the property 
captioned in the "Summary of Salient Features" which follows. 
Ihe accompanying report is based on a site inspection of improvements, 
investigation of the subject neighborhood area of influence, and review of 
sales, cost, and income data for similar properties. 
This appraisal has been made with particular attention paid to applicable 
value-influencing economic conditions and has been processed in accordance 
with nationally recognized appraisal guidelines. 
The value conclusions stated herein are as of the effective date as stated in 
the body of the appraisal, and contingent upon the certification and limiting 
conditions attached. 
Please do not hesitate to contact me or any of my staff if we can be of 
additional service to you. 
Respectfully, 
FRED W. HOYER, RA39981 
STATE REGISTERED APPRAISER 
ASSOCIATE APPRAISER 
GERAID B. HTGGS, ASA, CG37266 
STATE CERTIFIED APPRAISER 
CHIEF CHECK APPRAISER 
SUMMARY OF SALIENT FEATURES 
Subject Address 
Legal Description 
City 
County 
State 
Zip Code 
Census Tract 
Map Reference 
2869 EAST LIVE OAK CTECLE 
LOT 9 SPRING CREEK SUB 6128-2395 
SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE 
UTAH 
84117 
1109 
S .E . ! 
Sale Price $ REFINANCE 
Date of Sale SEPTEMBER 1992 
Borrower / Ciient BEVERLY BURGE 
Lender CROSSLAND MORTGAGE 
1 Size (Square Feet) 
Price per Square Foot 
Location 
Age 
Condition 
Total Rooms 
Bedrooms 
Baths 
1,738 
$ $77.68/SQ FT (AS APPRAISED) 
GOOD 
3 3 A - 1 2 EFF 
GOOD 
7 j 
3 
2 
Appraiser 
Date of Appraised Value 
FRED W. HOYER & GERALD 
4 SEPTEMBER 1 9 9 2 
B. HIGGS, ASA 
Final Estimate of Value $ 135,000 
LAW OFFICE OF 
LOUISE T. KNAUER 
2fi\ EAST .100 S<)( TH, Sl'ITE MO 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84 i 11 
FACSIMILE. (HOI) KY> 15S>7 
TELEPHONE. (801) .r>;32 6 3 0 0 
September 18, 1991 
Mr. Gary Thomas Facio 
318 K Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Mr. Facio: 
I have been retained by your spouse to represent her in this 
divorce action. 
Enclosed please find the Complaint for a divorce which has 
been drafted to begin divorce proceedings. I have also enclosed 
an Acceptance of Service, Consent and Waiver for your 
consideration. Please sign and have this document notarized and 
return it to me within ten (10) days if you agree to all the 
provisions contained in the Complaint. If you have any minor 
changes, you may add them to the Complaint and initial them, and 
if my client agrees we will proceed with those changes. 
By signing the Acceptance of Service, Consent and Waiver you 
are agreeing chat a Decree of Divorce in accordance with the 
Complaint may be entered, and that the default divorce hearing may 
take place without your receiving further notice, as it is 
necessary for only the party filing the action to attend. If you 
do execute the Acceptance of Service, Consent and Waiver, the 
divorce may be completed as soon as there is a hearing date 
available before the Judge, which would be within a couple of 
weeks. 
If I do not receive the Acceptance of Service, Consent and 
Waiver signed and notarized, from you within ten (10) days of the 
date of this letter, I will be forced to proceed by having you 
formally served by a constable, at which time you must either 
retain an attorney or represent yourself, and answer the Complaint 
within twenty (20) days. We will then have to try to settle the 
matter, either between us or in Court, all of which can take many 
months, even years. 
99 
CUEHJCO 
Mr. Gary Thomas Facio 
September 18, 1991 
Page 2 
If you have any questions regarding these documents, please 
contact me at the above phone number. However, I am obligated to 
inform you that I represent only your spouse, and therefore cannot 
give you legal advice. It is also my ethical obligation to suggest 
that before proceeding you may wish to consult an attorney. 
I look forward to hearing from you within ten (10) days. 
Sincerely yours, 
Louise T. Knauer 
Attorney at Law 
LTK/wtc 
Enc. 
cc: Beverly Burge 
MEMORANDUM 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
214 East Fifth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -3204 
Vox: (801) 328-9531 Fax; (801) 328-9533 
From the Desk of: BRIAN M. BARNARD 
Your Attention is Required 
• TO: David Larsen 
• FROM: BMB 
• RE: FACIO 
• DATE: May 19, 2000 (2:47 PM) 
I have briefly reviewed my files My recollection is that in -September, 1991, Gary Facio 
visited me and brought in a letter and a proposed divorce complaint from Louise Knaucr, Esq. 
representing his wife. 1 have copies in my file. We discussed his rights, etc. Apparently, that 
complaint was never filed. 
I did not consult with Gary Facio any further in 1991 or 1992. Several years later I was 
informed that an action for separate maintenance was filed in the Summer of 1992 and that Gary 
consented to the entry of such a decree 1 never met with Gary nor discussed that separate 
maintenance action with him before the entry of the decree in the 1992 action The first time that 
I became aware of that decree and its terms were several years after its entry. 
As to fees, to date Gary owes my office $5,613.75. We can give you an itemization of 
lhat, if needed. 
Brian M. Barnard 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of Au^OS^T . 2001, I hand 
delivered a copy of the ADDENDUM on each of the following: 
Original and 7 copies: 
Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
2 Copies: 
Connie Mower 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
